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Abstract
Background: The increase in empirical methods of research in bioethics over the last two
decades is typically perceived as a welcomed broadening of the discipline, with increased
integration of social and life scientists into the field and ethics consultants into the clinical setting,
however it also represents a loss of confidence in the typical normative and analytic methods of
bioethics.
Discussion: The recent incipiency of "Evidence-Based Ethics" attests to this phenomenon and
should be rejected as a solution to the current ambivalence toward the normative resolution of
moral problems in a pluralistic society. While "evidence-based" is typically read in medicine and
other life and social sciences as the empirically-adequate standard of reasonable practice and a
means for increasing certainty, I propose that the evidence-based movement in fact gains consensus
by displacing normative discourse with aggregate or statistically-derived empirical evidence as the
"bottom line". Therefore, along with wavering on the fact/value distinction, evidence-based ethics
threatens bioethics' normative mandate. The appeal of the evidence-based approach is that it offers
a means of negotiating the demands of moral pluralism. Rather than appealing to explicit values that
are likely not shared by all, "the evidence" is proposed to adjudicate between competing claims.
Quantified measures are notably more "neutral" and democratic than liberal markers like "species
normal functioning". Yet the positivist notion that claims stand or fall in light of the evidence is
untenable; furthermore, the legacy of positivism entails the quieting of empirically non-verifiable (or
at least non-falsifiable) considerations like moral claims and judgments. As a result, evidence-based
ethics proposes to operate with the implicit normativity that accompanies the production and
presentation of all biomedical and scientific facts unchecked.
Summary: The "empirical turn" in bioethics signals a need for reconsideration of the methods
used for moral evaluation and resolution, however the options should not include obscuring
normative content by seemingly neutral technical measure.
Background
The increase in empirical methods of research in bioethics
(or "empirical ethics") over the last two decades is typi-
cally perceived as a welcomed broadening of the disci-
pline, with increased integration of social and life
scientists into the field and ethics consultants into the
clinical setting [1]. Evidence-based ethics is the newest
empirical approach to bioethics inquiry, and while this
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method is still underdeveloped and the growing body of
literature still small, there is good reason to expect this
approach to really "take off" given the currency of "evi-
dence based" approaches in so many professional disci-
plines. This paper is an effort to temper the momentum of
the evidence-based movement and to reject its prolifera-
tion into bioethics. By examining the norms and implica-
tions of evidence-based practice in medicine, I aim to
demonstrate that an evidence-based approach is incom-
patible with bioethics' normative mandate and therefore
evidence-based ethics should not be pursued.
Empirical research in bioethics
Empirical research in bioethics (or "empirical ethics") is
"the application of research methods in the social sciences
(such as anthropology, epidemiology, psychology, and
sociology) to the direct examination of issues in [bioeth-
ics]" [2]. Empirical approaches describe (rather than pre-
scribe) "particular state[s] of affairs that [have] some
moral or ethical relevance" [2] and are thought to enrich
bioethics by calling attention to the social, cultural, and
cross-cultural aspects of morality accessed via the opin-
ions, interests and beliefs of patients, families, physicians,
nurses and others involved in care-giving [3]. For exam-
ple, empirical research can help describe cultural beliefs
about the appropriateness of informing the patient of a
diagnosed life-threatening illness, which will inform
deliberation about the extent to which it is morally impor-
tant for clinicians to provide comprehensive information
to patients in different cultural contexts [4]. Similarly,
empirical research can delineate popular attitudes and
experiences related to contentious issues such as abortion,
cloning, stem-cell research, and physician-assisted suicide
for consideration in discussions and policy formulations
[4]. Empirical work can also map the effects of particular
interventions aimed at improving how clinicians or policy
makers attempt to meet ethical obligations, such as
whether a particular method of presenting health related
information to a patient actually improves the patient's
understanding of her circumstances and the quality of
informed consent [4].
It is likely because proponents of empirical approaches to
bioethics focus on differentiating this area of bioethics
from normative ethics that the literature tends to use such
loose overarching descriptors as "an amalgam of empiri-
cal contributions" [1] and "methodological roots in social
sciences...to gather quantitative and qualitative data about
ethical issues" [1] when characterising empirical ethics.
The ease at which empirical ethics is generalised, and the
differences between the various social scientific disci-
plines represented under this heading glossed over, may
also be assisted by the common presumption that empir-
ical research presents "only the facts". This understanding
leads to underappreciation of the values typical to each
discipline as well as the beliefs of the individual practi-
tioner that influence the data gathering and interpretation
[5]. While presumably no one would deny the different
orientations, research agendas, and methods, of, say, psy-
chology and sociology, the emphasis placed on similari-
ties or shared features in order explain the novelty of
empirical ethics and distinguish it from philosophical
approaches to bioethics takes important attention away
from the relevant differences between the social scientific
disciplines that may render some empirical approaches
incompatible with the goals of ethical inquiry. This paper
focuses on one method of empirical ethics – evidence-
based bioethics, which is grounded in clinical epidemiol-
ogy and supported by the discipline's most distinctive
application, evidence-based medicine.
Discussion
Evidence based medicine and the evidence-based 
movement
While evidence-based ethics arises within the momentum
of what has been called "the empirical turn in bioethics"
[1] – the increased interest in empirical research in bioeth-
ics – it draws unique content from the evidence-based
movement that began in medicine only a decade and a
half ago in the form of "evidence-based medicine" and
then exploded into other professional disciplines. The
term "evidence based medicine" was first introduced in a
ubiquitous 1992 publication of the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association as a "new paradigm" in medical
education and practice by a group of professors of clinical
epidemiology, medical informatics, and biostatistics at
McMaster University calling themselves "The Evidence
Based Medicine Working Group" [6]. The evidence-based
medicine movement diagnosed the problems of medical
error and wasteful healthcare spending as stemming from
the prevalent use of unestablished medical interventions
and proposed to remedy these difficulties by way of a
decision-making technology that would eschew unsys-
tematic and so-called "intuitive" methods of individual
clinical experience in favour of a more scientifically rigor-
ous approach. According to the dictates of evidence-based
decision-making, clinical decisions should be based on
the best available scientific evidence and "identifying the
best evidence means using epidemiological and biostatis-
tical ways of thinking" [7]. The methodological privileg-
ing of outcomes measures, statistical analysis, and indexes
of aggregate behaviour that characterises clinical epidemi-
ology serves to distinguish evidence-based medicine from
traditional medicine, as the latter is charged with relying
on unsystematic observations, medical intuition, patho-
physiologic principles, and clinical experience [8].
While numerous techniques have been put in place to
facilitate the systematic management, evaluation, and
application of clinical data into evidence-based medicalBMC Medical Ethics 2005, 6:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/6/11
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practice, the most distinctive technology is the hierarchy
of evidence, a pre-graded ranking of experimental meth-
odologies. Evidence-based medicine proponents strongly
hold that the trustworthiness or validity of evidence is a
function of the design of the study from which the evi-
dence is obtained [9,10], and so the desire to use only the
"best evidence from clinical research" in the management
of individual patients [11] has resulted in elaborate classi-
ficatory schemes for ranking the value of different types of
studies. Among the numerous published formulations
[12,13], there is a consistent placement of randomised
controlled trials or the systematic review of them at the
top, retrospective studies well down the list, and clinical
anecdotes are seen as providing little if any evidence for
the value of intervention.
Evidence as accumulated data has been made widely and
easily available to clinicians, educators, actuaries, and
medical funding bodies by evolving information technol-
ogies such as electronic databases and systematic reviews
of clinical trials. The political and professional capital of
evidence-based medicine cannot be overstated, as this evi-
dence-based practice is supposed to increase professional
responsibility and accountability, improve patient care,
and make managed care and medical research more cost
effective by ensuring that only the most promising tech-
nologies are funded. The combined picture of evidence-
based medicine as ethically driven to improve patient
care, fiscally responsible, and technologically up-to-date
likely drove the rapid integration of the movement into
medicine, where fifteen years after the Evidence Based
Medicine Working Group first formed, evidence-based
medicine is now common parlance within health care. As
a burgeoning institution, academic centres and journals
dedicated to evidence-based medicine's advancement
have been established with much fanfare, and the evi-
dence-based movement has moved into numerous other
fields, including nursing, public health, education and
social work. The promise of the evidence-based move-
ment to provide a systematic method for determining best
practices has been so enthusiastically adopted in these
fields that it is hardly surprising to find it generating atten-
tion as a promising new approach to bioethics in the form
of "evidence-based ethics".
Bioethics
Since its evolution into a distinct discipline, bioethics has
typically employed the analytic methods of Anglo-Ameri-
can philosophy to answer the ethical questions that arise
in health care. While the methods have diversified consid-
erably from the deductive approaches of "applied ethics"
that still typify the field to include casuist, contextualist,
and reflexive methods, the field maintains a normative
mandate. It is this self-understanding, and the worry that
empirical approaches to bioethics waver on the fact/value
distinction, that encouraged a significant antagonism
toward empirical research in bioethics that is only begin-
ning to subside [1]. Despite numerous contestations of
this bifurcation [14], the descriptive and prescriptive sci-
ences are still regarded as quite distinct entities.
Some commentators on the "empirical turn in bioethics"
have regarded the interest in empirical research as repre-
senting a loss of confidence in the typical normative and
analytic methods of bioethics [15]. While many describe
those "typical" methods inaccurately – offering a "straw
man" account of applied ethics where absolutely no
empirical considerations are included in the deductive
process of ethical deliberation, for example,  [16] – they
are at least correct in recognising a felt ambivalence
regarding the possibility of negotiating competing values
in a pluralist society that respects difference. The tech-
nique of "evidence-based decision-making" offers what
seems like a solution to this so-called "postmodern" prob-
lem, as it proposes to ground decisions in something con-
crete and universal, namely the evidence. The allure of
evidence should not be underappreciated, as it is thought
to be able to assist us in seeing past our habits, biases, and
mistakes to decipher "best practices". The rapid ascend-
ancy of the evidence-based movement, which started in
medicine and quickly spread to other professional disci-
plines, speaks to the movement's enormous appeal. Even
the popularity of the CSI television series – which depicts
"evidence-based" police work par excellence – demon-
strates how the stability, fairness, and truth of "the evi-
dence" have captured our imagination. There are
considerable difficulties with an "evidence-based"
approach to bioethics, however, that require considera-
tion.
Evidence-based ethics
Evidence-based ethics has been defined in the literature as
follows:
As in medical decisions based on evidence-based medi-
cine, ethical decisions based on evidence-based ethics
would involve conscientious and judicious use of the best
evidence relevant to the care and prognosis of the patient
to promote better informed and better justified ethical
decision making [17].
What this actually entails in practice is somewhat vague,
as there are numerous ways in which empirical research
can inform ethical decision making, numerous types of
evidence that are relevant to the care and prognosis of
patients, and numerous measures of best evidence. What is
clear, however, is evidence-based ethics' close methodo-
logical proximity to evidence-based medicine, as the lan-
guage of "conscientious and judicious use of best
evidence" is recognisably lifted from the early program-BMC Medical Ethics 2005, 6:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/6/11
Page 4 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
matic literature on evidence-based medicine [8]. The
implications of this relationship are the focus of this
paper, as evidence-based medicine offers a distinct
accounting of the nature of evidence, what evidence
counts, and what role the evidence plays in the decision-
making process. Understanding evidence-based ethics
requires comprehension of the evidence-based approach
to medicine.
Jeremy Sugarman, a known supporter of evidence-base
ethics, argues that in both medical and ethical investiga-
tions, "it is important to 'raise the bar' on what evidence
is acceptable to determine the most effective approaches"
[18]. In both cases, he argues, evidence derived from ran-
domised trials has the most utility [18]. Sugarman's
appeal for rigorous methods and his attention to experi-
mental methodology recall the hierarchy of evidence's
consistent privileging of randomised controlled trials and
systematic review of these trials over less objective meas-
ures such as surveys or qualitative research. The founding
of evidence based medicine by clinical epidemiologists
and biostatisticians should explain this methodological
privileging, as randomised controlled trials produce the
clinical data required for health outcomes research.
Keeping in mind evidence-based ethics' subscription to
the "evidence based" doctrine, it becomes apparent that
the term "evidence-based ethics" has been misunderstood
and misused by some of its alleged proponents. In Robert
Jansen's paper, "Evidence-Based Ethics and the Regulation
of Reproduction" [19], the author uses the term to mean
the testing of ethical arguments, statements, and the back-
ground assumptions informing those arguments, by
means of empirical research. Jansen argues that Canada's
prohibitions on sex selection for human reproduction
relies on the untested empirical claim that sex selection
often leads to some index of family dysfunction. He finds
it ironic that Canada insists on evidence-based
approaches for medical services but not for the social
restrictions on reproductive medicine proposed by the
Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technol-
ogies, which, he claims, made determinations of "women's
true interests" without properly surveying the relevant
attitudes and behaviours exhibited by the public. Against
what Jansen perceived as the Commission's "hijacking" of
ethical questions and their treatment of empirically verifi-
able hypotheses about the social consequences of permis-
sive policies as "self-evident moral truths", he
recommends a publicly accountable empirical approach
that encourages debate and the determination of facts.
Jansen's understanding of "evidence based ethics" seems
to be no different from the empirical ethics already in cir-
culation insofar as it serves to inform moral deliberation
(and therefore does not introduce a new empirical/ethics
relation) [20]. It is worth noting that even prior to the
incipience of empirical ethics, empirical content always
informed ethical deliberation, whether to determine the
actual or probable consequences of actions for conse-
quentialist reasoning or to specify the norms of deonto-
logical consideration. In bioethics, surveys or in-depth
interviews that gauge patients' or clinicians' attitudes or
behaviours often serve as the data that philosophically-
trained bioethicists reflect on in order to draw moral con-
clusions [21].
The evidence-based medicine hierarchy of evidence's
maligning of the very techniques that empirical ethics so
often employs suggests dissimilarity between empirical
ethics and evidence-based bioethics. The surveys and in-
depth interviews that are commonly used to determine
the attitudes and behaviours of patients, clinicians, or the
general public regarding bioethical issues are less valued
and are ranked lower than the carefully controlled and
quantified evidence that is derived from randomised con-
trolled trials and other more objective methods. This sug-
gests evidence-based ethics to be a distinct moment
within the "empirical turn in bioethics" rather than, as
Pascall Borry and colleagues' historical account seems to
suggests, more of the same [1].
The second sense in which evidence-based ethics is used is
as "the necessary grounding of ethical decisions in the best
available scientific evidence" [1]. Jon Tyson's [22] and
Terri Major-Kincade and colleagues' [17] work on clinical
determinations of whether or not to treat severely disa-
bled premature newborns enlist this use of the term "evi-
dence-based bioethics", which I read to be a more accurate
interpretation of the term because of its consistency with
the methods of evidence-based medicine. It has already
been discussed that evidence-based medicine is typified
by the systematic introduction of scientific proof in
healthcare interventions. Health care practices are thought
to surely improve by means of decision-making based on
a careful appraisal of the best available scientific evidence
[23]. Tyson's and Major-Kincade et al.'s work offers deci-
sion-making techniques for determining whether or not
to treat the patient that rely almost exclusively on the pro-
jected survival and disability outcomes of these infants.
Major-Kincade et al. even employ a controlled trial to
demonstrate the efficacy of their educational curriculum
for teaching evidence-based ethics to NICU residents.
Tyson describes evidence-based ethics as involving multi-
ple considerations in its determination of what consti-
tutes "reasonable care" that include: (i) the quality of
evidence available; (ii) the identified benefits, hazards,
and costs of treatment; and (iii) the values and preferences
of the parent or surrogate. In Major-Kincade et al's com-
plementary paper detailing the implementation of an evi-BMC Medical Ethics 2005, 6:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/6/11
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dence-based ethics educational intervention, the
"evidence" was specified to mean mortality and disability
outcomes for infants that receive intensive care.
Given that Tyson claims to appreciate that treatment deci-
sions for extremely premature infants involve highly com-
plex ethical issues and multiple considerations, it comes
as a surprise when he proposes, in the end, an algorithm
[24] for instances of "mandatory", "unreasonable", and
"optional" treatment based entirely on the projected out-
comes (that is, survival rates and disability-free years) for
neonates of particular birth weights, gestational ages, and
health conditions. Even the professed importance of con-
sidering the parents or surrogates' values and preferences
is limited to situations where the infant's clinical indica-
tors fit her into the category of "optional" treatment. While
the description of the multiple considerations that go into
evidence-based ethical decision-making sounded reason-
ably comprehensive at first glance, certain limitations on
how evidence is understood, what constitutes a "benefit"
or a "harm" and who determines and measures them, and
even when the parents' values play in, all narrow the
deliberative process to a decision based on projected out-
comes and an imposed cost per value calculation of Qual-
ity Adjusted Life Years and Disability Adjusted Life Years
relative to financial cost of treatment. Mandatory treat-
ment, for example, occurs when there is "credible evi-
dence that benefits outweigh burdens" [22], with is no
mention of who determines these criteria and how they
are measured. These determinations were formulated
against the backdrop of standardised clinical protocols
being simply assumed to be preferable, more transparent,
and fairer than case-by-case decision-making. These
assumptions will soon be demonstrated to be consistent
with the "epidemiological and biostatistical ways of
thinking" that the founders of evidence-based medicine
so strongly promoted.
The feature of Tyson's and Major-Kincade et al.'s methods
that truly exemplify an evidence-based approach is that
rather than having a wide range of empirical evidence
inform  ethical decision making (as is seen in typical
accounts of empirical ethics), their techniques use scien-
tific evidence (narrowly construed) to determine  right
action. Against Sugarman's claim that "empirical research
[into bioethics] will not answer the ought question of
bioethics" [4], evidence-based ethics seems to do just that.
The slide from "is" to "ought" has already been noticed in
evidence-based medicine. While the is of evidence-based
medicine is that science is producing new and better ways
of predicting, detecting and treating disease than were
once even imaginable, the ought  is that its advocates
believe that clinicians ought to be responsible for keeping
up to date with these advances and ought to be prepared
to offer them to patients. Brian Haynes, one of the found-
ers of the movement who has noticeably tempered his
proclamations in recent years about the transformative
ability of evidence-based medicine, has noted that "evi-
dence-based medicine has taken on the tones of a moral
imperative [even though] it is premature to get very
preachy about the ought of evidence-based medicine"
[25]. Another similarity between evidence-based medi-
cine and evidence-based ethics is that the scope of "scien-
tific evidence" is narrowed to exclude most forms of social
scientific and qualitative evidence and is limited instead
almost exclusively to medical outcomes, which is the evi-
dence of choice according to the methodological hierar-
chies of evidence-based medicine.
The evidence-based doctrine problematically assumes
that the presence of reliable evidence ensures that better
decisions will be made. Medical decision-making, how-
ever, draws upon a broad spectrum of knowledge (or mul-
tiple dimensions of evidence), including scientific
evidence, personal experience, personal values, economic
and political considerations, and philosophical princi-
ples. It is not always clear how practitioners integrate these
factors into a final decision, but what is clear is that med-
icine can never be entirely free of value judgments [26].
Normative content seems to enter at all levels of decision-
making, even in the production and presentation of the
scientific evidence that is supposed to univocally inform
evidence-based decisions [27]. The very notion of evi-
dence and the boundaries of what counts as evidence is a
social construct, as evidence is always the product of a
socially produced question. Even "evidence-based" is a
normative concept.
In Tyson's attention to systematic measures and formulaic
approaches, he glosses over the value judgments that go
into the evaluation of "reasonable" and "unreasonable"
actions. He similarly takes as "given" the implicit norma-
tivity in his "medical cost relative to value" formula for
deciding how to use limited health care resources. In his
accounting, the cost utility of neonatal intensive care is
expressed as the cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)
gained as a result of neonatal intensive care. The life-years
gained are then reduced according to the number of disa-
bled survivors and the severity of those disabilities. While
Tyson seems to think that deferral to measurement is
transparent and fair – presumably because the life circum-
stances of individual families do not bias the assessment
– the values implicit in these measures go unchecked.
Even his recognition of "the fact that it is difficult to know
how to adjust appropriately for disability and disease, in
part because quality of life in the presence of handicaps
and chronic illnesses may be rated higher by those
affected than by other persons" does not seem to deter
him from formulating an evidence-based decision-mak-BMC Medical Ethics 2005, 6:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/6/11
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ing algorithm and assuming the justice of measurement in
general.
By this account of evidence-based ethics, one might ask
how evidence-based ethics differs from evidence-based
medicine, as both involve making health care decisions
based on the best evidence, where evidence is narrowly
defined as having to do with systematic observations from
certain types of scientific research. Alternatively, one
might question whether evidence-based ethics represents
a misappropriation of the word "ethics" [28].
"Evidence based" approaches and practices
While "evidence-based" is typically read in medicine and
other life and social sciences as the empirically-adequate
standard of reasonable practice and as a means for
increasing certainty, the evidence-based movement in fact
gains consensus by displacing normative discourse with
aggregate or statistically-derived empirical evidence as the
"bottom line". The techniques invoked in the name of
"evidence-based" decision-making require a positivistic
reliance on "the evidence" in its epistemological promise
to ascertain truth or certainty by examination of the evi-
dence. These techniques act to obscure the multiple and
complex considerations that unavoidably go into health
care decisions at both the micro- and macro- level and
allows for the promotion of particular political agendas
and interests under the guise of "better science" [29].
Despite the promise to revolutionise medicine and the
language of "new paradigms", the term "evidence based
medicine" has a ring of obviousness to it that makes it dif-
ficult to argue against. Few physicians, one suspects,
would be willing to assert that they do not attempt to base
their clinical decision-making on available evidence. Sci-
entific progress, in fact, is popularly understood to have
been motivated by the evidence-based practices of inno-
vative scientists. Rejecting the dogma and superstition
that pervaded their historical moment, these innovators
let the evidence, as gathered through unbiased and careful
experimentation, dictate their scientific practices, beliefs,
and theories.
Yet the seeming obviousness of evidence-based medicine
is suspect. Post-positivist philosophies of science over the
past half century have contested the popular understand-
ing of observational evidence as value-free, pretheoretical,
self-apparent, and therefore sufficient to verify or at least
falsify scientific hypotheses [30]. The social nature of sci-
ence is thought to involve considerable normative content
in its knowledge producing activities, and these values are
not excised in the context of justification. Feminist episte-
mologists of science, such as Helen Longino [31] and
Lynne Hankinson Nelson [32], have called for explicit rec-
ognition and critical appraisal of these values, as tech-
niques that presume the value neutrality of science in fact
distort scientific practice. The same concern arises in med-
icine, where evidence-based medicine only seems  com-
mon sense because it has been stripped of the social
context of medical practice in its professed deferral to only
"the evidence". In an age where the institutional power of
medicine is suspect, a model that represents biomedi-
cine's power as disinterested (or merely "scientific")
should give pause. Keith Denny reads evidence-based
medicine as a discourse that resists contemporary chal-
lenges to established medical authority [33]. While evi-
dence-based medicine appears to question the authority
of individual physicians, it works instead to reinforce that
authority through its regulation. Furthermore, evidence-
based medicine does not  question the institutional
authority of medicine within society, the way healthcare
dollars are allocated for the necessary clinical research,
and what role the pharmaceutical industry plays in setting
the research agenda.
Evidence-based practices maintain the distinct ability to
sidestep value differences and political disputes by
appealing to the evidence as the bottom line. This move is
positivist in its elimination of culture, contexts, and the
subjects of knowledge production from consideration. It
is also attractive in an age of moral pluralism. This con-
ceptual linking of methods of abstraction to ascertain
truth and progressive politics is reminiscent of the radical
politics of early logical positivists like Otto Neurath. In
post-war Germany, an epistemological system that
avoided the pitfalls of fascism and successfully unified
systems of science and thought was perceived to be a pro-
gressive step. Only later did "unity of science" theses come
to be seen as imperialist and assimilationist and rejected
by innovative thinkers in favour of "disunity" and "plural-
ist" post-modern positions [34].
In health care justice and policy, we see appeals by liberal
thinkers to allegedly neutral markers like "species normal
functioning". We know, of course, that these measures are
not neutral, as people with disabilities and chronic ill-
nesses and elderly people consistently fare poorly in this
political calculus. Popular thinking holds, however, that if
it is neutrality that is desired, numbers are the pinnacle. In
this age of the ascendancy of health outcomes research,
where statistical analysis dominates health policy deci-
sionmaking, "evidence" is tantamount to measure and not
meaning.
Statistical inference is pursued precisely for its superficial-
ity and its ability to measure broad rather than individual
experience. It was its ability to isolate more general varia-
bles and phenomena that permit more open and egalitar-
ian debate about social questions that caught the
attention of liberals and would-be reformers such asBMC Medical Ethics 2005, 6:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/6/11
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Neurath and Auguste Comte. Yet generalisations and
standards contain implicit socially framed and mediated
values with a range of implications that can order and
enhance, but also tyrannise, aspects of our lives. The suc-
cess of generalisation is achieved at the expense of contin-
gent and contextual knowledge that needs to be filtered
out [35].
Evidence-based decision-making faces inherent limita-
tions insofar as only certain kinds of experience can be
quantified and only certain questions explored [26]. Data-
driven approaches to patient care have been argued to nar-
row our ability to effect actions in clinical encounters, as
statements of averaged probability become unquestioned
laws of possibilities [36]. They limit appreciation of the
subtleties and exceptions that characterise all efforts to
diagnose and treat illness and displace the critical and vast
source of information for treatment, diagnosis and mean-
ingful management of illness that is found in human
interaction. Furthermore, evidence-based decision-mak-
ing ignores the contingency of medical knowledge. While
efforts to capture such encounters in aggregate terms have
become increasingly sophisticated and thorough, the lim-
itations just mentioned are part and parcel of epidemio-
logical methods and simply cannot be overcome.
We ought to be attentive to the historical moment in
which we find ourselves, when the challenges and ques-
tions raised by the fragmentation of the medical subject
and its recreation as an average probability seem "obvi-
ous". In his historical account of the rise of managed care,
Gary Belkin situates managed care not as an inevitable
response to cost control and economic inefficiency, but
within a history of appeals to standardised and ostensible
objective measures and models of human behaviour to
resolve contentious issues in complex and modern capi-
talist democratic societies [37]. Evidence-based medicine
and evidence-based ethics similarly resolve normative
questions and policy issues, such as whether or not to
treat a newborn with severe disabilities, by transforming
them into problems of measurement. Interestingly, the
appeals to technical formulas and standardised informa-
tion satisfies the strong wish that we have for open, relia-
ble, and presumably objective methods for the resolution
of controversy.
Because evidence-based medicine is largely an effort to
manage the unruly social world (in which medicine is
practiced) via objective scientific procedure, the move-
ment appears to be the latest expression of "scientism",
modernity's rationalist dream that science can produce
the knowledge required to emancipate us from scarcity,
ignorance, and error. However, such efforts tend to dis-
guise political interests in the authority of so-called "sci-
entific evidence". The configuration of policy
considerations and clinical standards into questions of
evidence conveniently transforms normative questions
into technical ones. Political issues are not resolved, but
merely disguised in technocratic consideration and lan-
guage. Thus the goals of medicine and other normative
considerations lie just below the surface of these eviden-
tiary questions, and evidence becomes an instrument of,
rather than a substitute for, politics.
To illustrate this, consider that the outcomes movement
has been invoked to support political efforts to increas-
ingly privatise American health care [38], as the valuing of
standardised measures, aggregate behaviour, and radically
fragmented medical knowledge supports the logic of the
medical marketplace. Because evidence-based medicine
legitimates the distillation of medical truth outside of the
clinical encounter, where statistical information is privi-
leged over the physician's clinical judgment in clinical
decisionmaking, the rationale of a healthcare marketplace
populated by independent and rational buyers and sellers
is validated. It is in the name of "better science" that par-
ticular economic interests can be furthered. The enthusi-
asm for standardised measures in clinical practice,
consistency among professionals in therapeutic interven-
tions, and gold standards of clinical science reflect a med-
ical logic that prefers abstracted measure over
individualised history and pathology. Medical authority
is, therefore, no longer framed in scientific discourse but
in late 20th/early-21st century capitalist discourse with its
ideological extolling of the importance of "information"
– a move that co-opts demands for democracy and holism
in medicine [33]. This is done by appeal to "the evidence"
– the unbiased bottom line. Evidence serves as a tool to
maintain power by attempting to ignore the conflict of
norms at play in politically contentious issues. Habermas
has argued that the separation of the technical and the
political is an instructive mark of modernity [39]. This
removal of normative content from the ideological appa-
ratuses has the dangerous effect of depoliticising the
organization of social life and therefore justifying its insti-
tutions by rendering them functional within a system of
supposedly technically necessary activity.
Much like positivism threatened ethics by rendering it
"senseless", an "evidence based" approach proposes to
make moral deliberation redundant as it offers a method
to resolve ethical and political questions about healthcare
spending and practice by appeal to technical measure. The
normative issues therefore get co-opted by supposedly
neutral technique. An "evidence based" ethics would
therefore threaten bioethics' normative mandate.
Summary
In medicine, bioethicists are typically attuned to the mul-
tiple dimensions of the illness experience that eludesBMC Medical Ethics 2005, 6:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/6/11
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quantification and measurement. Science, according to
medical humanists, is just one layer of description of the
phenomenological world. Evidence-based medicine's reli-
ance on scientific evidence has been criticised for mischar-
acterising modern health care's constitution by diverse
academic traditions and knowledges – including the
humanities, social sciences, and the pure and applied sci-
ences – that rely on equally diverse notions of evidence
[40]. While bioethicists attend to the normative features
of medical decision-making, evidence-based ethics sug-
gests a moment of inattentiveness to the normativity of
moral decision-making. Recognition of the plurality of val-
ues and meanings in operation complicates our use of
moral and ethical terms and categories; however, the
quick turn to various truth-producing strategies labelled
"empirical" that has taken place warrants careful consider-
ation. While the "empirical turn" in bioethics signals a
need for reconsideration of the methods used for moral
evaluation and resolution, the options should not include
obscuring normative content by seemingly neutral techni-
cal measure.
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